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Abstract—Living organisms are under permanent pres-
sure to take decisions with an impact on their success.
Such decisions require information, which can be for-
mulated in the precise sense of Shannon information.
Since information processing is costly for organisms,
this creates an adaptive pressure for cognition to be
as informationally parsimonious as possible. Combining
information theory with the theory of reinforcement
learning for modeling tasks, we present a number of
quantitative analyses how the cognitive burden of an
agent deriving from a task can be relieved by the
environment and, more specifically, its embodiment. This
can be interpreted as moving towards a giving a specific
and precise quantitative meaning to Paul’s and Pfeifer’s
concept of morphological computation and highlighting
the central importance of the embodiment for the success
of cognition.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the goals of the studies of Artificial Life is to
identify universal principles governing the dynamics of
organisms, which are not tied to a particular substrate
and which abstract away the particular biological “im-
plementation”, and thus carry over to artificial agents.
Various approaches, such as dynamical systems model-
ing [1], cellular automata [2], [3] and many others have
been suggested for this purpose. In the last decade, a
new class of approaches based on information theory
has been receiving increasing attention. In contrast to
the former, it aims at addressing aspects of Artificial
Life in a mechanism-free way: instead of aiming to
specify mechanisms modeling particular phenomena,
one specifies (e.g. optimality) principles which result
in the desired phenomenon, without making any as-
sumptions about which mechanisms would actually
“implement” these principles. This allows for different
choices of mechanisms as long as they result in the
same macrodynamics. It provides a mesoscopic level of
modeling between high-level, phenomenological and
low-level, fine-grained models of Artificial Life.
II. INFORMATION AND COGNITIVE PROCESSING
Interestingly, information theory has already been rec-
ognized as an important potential tool for cognitive
modeling only shortly after the concept of informa-
tion had been introduced in [4], namely in the con-
text of cybernetics and biology [5]–[7]. Evidence for
information-maximization principles in biology [8]–
[10] and for sensors operating at the physically possible
limits of information acquisition [11]–[14] indicates
that informational optimality is a candidate for a prin-
ciple of central importance to biological organisms.
To use such principles, one needs to cast an agent
operating in its environment as a control scenario, in
which an agent interacts with the environment exerting
a certain amount of control over it [15]–[18]. The
informational picture of the perception-action loop has
studied in various contexts and scenarios [19]–[22].
More importantly, however, these considerations allow
one to formulate fundamental limits on the minimal
amount of information required for particular tasks,
be it a reduction of environmental entropy [15] or the
navigation to a target position from a random starting
position [18].
Whereas in Shannon’s original scenario there is no
mechanism to formulate a particular “semantics” or
purpose of how transmitted information is to be ac-
tually used the information bottleneck method demon-
strates how to separate relevant from irrelevant portions
of Shannon information [23]; this can be extended
towards agent scenarios by “qualifying” information
via a utility function which attaches a value to each
action an agent takes in a particular state [24]. In the
case of rewards delayed over a prolonged period, this
utility can be modeled by so-called Markovian Deci-
sion Processes, MDPs (which are studied in Reinforce-
ment Learning), and combined with the information-
theoretic view [25]–[27].
The bottom line of these considerations is that, for an
agent to take a decision that achieves particular utility
in its world, a certain minimum amount of informa-
tion processing is necessarily required. Together with
aforementioned hypothesis that information is costly
for organisms, this suggests that organisms would obey
a principle of information parsimony, minimizing the
information required to achieve a sufficient utility [14].
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Assuming that the information processing cost gives
a quantitative characterization of the “cognitive load”
of an agent, we are going to study how this cognitive
load can be partly relieved by the environment. It will
turn out that, under this view, not just the structure
and dynamics of the environment per se is important,
but how it relates to the particular task, and, more
specifically, also the embodiment of the agent which
we will here intend to mean how precisely the agent is
linked into the environment1 This suggests a quantita-
tive interpretation of the phenomenon of “morpholog-
ical” or “environmental” computation which has been
postulated as basis for the success of suitably embodied
agents [28]–[30].
The paper is structured as follows: in Sec. III we
introduce basic notation, notions and principles of the
MDPs models used, in Sec. IV we explain how these
are expanded towards the informational framework,
in Sec. V we present the experiments and results,
concluding in Sec. VI with a discussion.
III. MODEL
In the following, we present the model from [25] which
will be used for the experiments. The agent’s prefer-
ences and decision process is modeled as a Marko-
vian Decision Process (MDP). MDPs are a popular
approach for modeling sequences of decisions taken
by an agent in the face of delayed accumulation of
rewards. The structure of the rewards defines the tasks
the agent is supposed to achieve. In the present paper,
we will restrict ourselves to a simple navigation task,
but the formalism is significantly more general [31].
We begin by introducing general notation and the MDP
concept.
A. Notation and Definitions
1) Probabilities: First, we introduce some nota-
tion and conventions. We use uppercase characters
X,Y,Z, . . . for random variables, lowercase characters
x, y, z, . . . for the values they assume and curved
characters X ,Y,Z, . . . for their respective domains
which we always assume finite. The probability that
a random variable X assumes a value x ∈ X is
written P (X = x), however for simplicity we will
use the simpler form p(x) instead by abuse of notation
whenever there is no danger of confusion. In particular,
in writing p(x) we will not make an explicit distinction
between the distribution of the random variable X and
the probability value p(x) for the particular outcome
x ∈ X . We write p(x, y, z) for the joint distribution
1Here, we will, unlike some other work, not make a distinction
between “real” and “simulated” scenarios in using the term embod-
iment.
of random variables X,Y,Z, and p(y|x) for the con-
ditional distribution of Y given X .
2) Entropy and Mutual Information: Given a random
variable X , define its entropy H(X) as H(X) :=
−
∑
x∈X p(x) log p(x) where we always assume a
binary logarithm. Thus the entropy will be expressed
in bits, and is a measure of the uncertainty about
the outcome of the random experiment X . For jointly
distributed variables X,Y , the entropy is defined as
H(X,Y ) := −
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y p(x, y) log p(x, y) which
is equivalent to the entropy of the (single) joint random
variable (X,Y ). For the random variable pair X,Y , the
conditional entropy is defined as
H(Y |X) :=
∑
x∈X
p(x)H(Y |X = x)
= −
∑
x∈X
p(x)
∑
y∈Y
p(y|x) log p(y|x) .
Finally, define the mutual information between X and
Y as
I(X;Y ) := H(Y )−H(Y |X) , (1)
i.e. the reduction in uncertainty about the outcome of
Y if the outcome of X is known.
3) Markovian Decision Processes (MDPs): Infor-
mally, an MDP is a model for an agent taking se-
quential decisions in an environment with the following
properties:
1) The world consists of states and an agent which
has a policy that determines which actions it
selects in which states.
2) After each action taken, the agent obtains a
reward (which may be negative). These rewards
are cumulated over the lifetime of the agent and
determine its achieved utility.
3) Being Markovian, MDPs have no hidden states
— that means that, in principle, the agent has
full access to the state of the world. We will
discuss this assumption briefly in Sec. IV-C. For
the particular study, this is not a restriction.
We now formally define MDPs, adopting in the nota-
tion from [31] with slight modifications. A Markovian
Decision Process is defined by its set of states S, its
set of actions A, and the pair (Ps′s,a,Rs
′
s,a) defined for
all s, s′ ∈ S and a ∈ A; here Ps′s,a is the probability
that by performing an action a in a state s, the agent
will move to state s′ and Rs′s,a is the expected reward
for this particular transition.
P
s′
s,a defines a transition (“structure of the world”) and
R
s′
s,a a reward structure. Given (Ps
′
s,a,R
s′
s,a), an agent
can employ a policy pi which specifies its decision
process: an action a in a state s is selected with
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probability pi(a|s). Over the course of a single run,
an agent will accumulate a reward
∑∞
t′=t rt′ , starting
at time2 t. The expectation value for this cumulated
reward is obtained by averaging over the transition
probabilities Ps′s,a and the policy pi(a|s). Given a
starting state s and a policy pi, this is the value V pi(s)
of the state s following policy pi. It can be expressed
via the recursive Bellman equation
V pi(s) =
∑
a∈A
pi(a|s) ·
∑
s′∈S
P
s′
s,a ·
[
R
s′
s,a + V
pi(s′)
]
.
(2)
This equation can be used as a fixed point iteration
(value iteration) for V pi by inserting an estimate for V pi
on the right side and obtaining an improved estimate
for it on the left side until convergence. Sometimes it
is convenient to further decompose this equation into
the Qpi function which distinguishes the values attained
for a given state s as different actions a are applied:
Qpi(s, a) =
∑
s′∈S
P
s′
s,a ·
[
R
s′
s,a + V
pi(s′)
]
. (3)
Qpi(s, a) is the utility attained if, in state s, the agent
carries out action a, and after that begins to follow pi.
This representation of the utility allows one to directly
evaluate different actions a in a given state s.
In the traditional MDP optimization one now seeks a
policy pi∗ which maximizes the — unique — value
function V ∗(s) for all states s. Here, however, we
will be interested in a modification of the problem,
incorporating the decision costs into the problem.
4) Notes on the MDP Definition: Before we proceed
to do so, we mention the conventions used here. First,
we assume transition probabilities Ps′s,a into states
which are not successors of s to be 0. Furthermore,
here we only consider navigation tasks and model the
goal states of our experimental scenarios as absorbing
states which the agent cannot leave once reached.
Second, in the traditional MDP definitions, one as-
sumes that, in the most general case, different states
s may have different action sets As. Here we deviate
slightly from this in that we require the action set
A to be the same over all states s. The rationale for
this requirement is at the core our interpretation of the
decision maker as agent: the embodiment of the agent
implies a consistent set of “atomic” actions available to
the agent throughout the world — an embodied agent
always “takes its actions with it” and the available set
of action choices from which the agent selects does
not change from state to state 3. The effect of actions,
2For the sake of simplicity, we do not consider a discount over
time.
3We exclude actuator evolution or meta-actions, such as the
options model.
however, will in general differ in various ways from
state to state.
This is, from the point of MDPs, a seemingly minor
technical requirement which can be easily accomo-
dated4 and has no tangible consequences. However,
this assumption about the embodiment, i.e. about a
particular consistent action set available to the agent
throughout the world, will turn out in Sec. V-B to have
major consequences, once we take the information
costs of decision making into consideration.
IV. INFORMATION IN THE DECISION PROCESS
A. Overview and Rationale
In this paper, we are not concerned with the cost of
learning policies, but delegate that consideration to
a generic evolutionary or otherwise adaptive “black
box” algorithm (concretely, the algorithm given in
Sec. IV-D) which computes the policies. The criterion
that we will apply instead is that the policy will
be informationally parsimonious. We will make this
notion precise in the current section.
First, some general qualitative considerations: if there
exists only one optimal policy for the MDP, then that
policy is unambiguous and has a given information
processing cost. However, if there are multiple optimal
policies, then asking for the informationally cheapest
one among these optimal policies becomes a more in-
teresting question. Even more interesting becomes the
issue when we do no longer demand that the solution
be perfectly optimal. After all, strict optimality in one
criterium is not the typical situation in biologically
relevant scenarios, as many other considerations come
into play. Thus, if we only require the expected reward
E[V (S)] to achieve a “sufficiently” large value, the
information cost for such a suboptimal (but informa-
tionally parsimonious) policy will be generally lower.
The extreme case is that of a “blind” agent without
information processing cost: it follows the same (but
possibly probabilistic) policy independently of the state
it is in. In the following, we now make these notions
precise and reiterate the methods to compute these
policies, where we follow the method from [25].
B. Core Model
Consider an MDP (Ps′s,a,Rs
′
s,a) (state set S and action
set A, as in Sec. III-A3). One can consider an agent
graphically as a Bayesian Network, Fig. 1. The random
variables S0, S1, S2, . . . denote the (complete) state of
4To model in our notation action sets As that change between
different states s, we characterize illegal (unavailable) actions, i.e.
actions outside of As, by penalizing them via a infinitely negative
reward Rs′
s,a
:= −∞.
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the world at times t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . Depending on St,
the action At at each time t is selected according to
the policy pi(at|st) which is fixed throughout the run.
Depending on the particular given state st and the
action selected at, the new state is generated according
to probability distribution p(st+1|st, at) ≡ Pst+1st,at .
S0 //
pi

S1 //
pi

S2 //
pi

. . .
A0
AA







A1
AA







. . .
Fig. 1. Bayesian Network indicating the decision structure for an
agent
The decision cost incurred by the agent is given by the
mutual information
I(S;A) =
∑
s∈S
p(s)
∑
a∈A
pi(a|s) log
pi(a|s)∑
s′∈S pi(a|s
′) p(s′)
(4)
(essentially a reformulation of (1)). Note that we
consider (4) independent of time: we will assume a
“steady state” where we do not start the decision
process at a specific time but “tap” randomly into the
decision process. We will thus simplify the discussion
by assuming a fixed distribution of the states p(s) for
all time steps.
With these assumptions, the information cost given
by (4) then depends only on the state distribution
p(s) and the policy pi and, since we here consider
p(s) as fixed, our only variable of interest becomes
pi. We now proceed to determine a policy pi which
is informationally parsimonious, i.e. which minimizes
I(S;A) for a given utility level E[V pi(S)].
C. Informationally Optimal Policies
For didactic reasons, we describe the issue of infor-
mationally parsimonious solutions in two steps. We
first consider only optimal strategies which achieve the
(unique) optimal value function V ∗(s). This is only
achieved if a (not necessarily unique) optimal policy
pi∗ is used by the agent. If the optimal policy is not
unique, then one can impose an additional optimality
principle amongst the optimal policies, namely seeking
one that is informationally parsimonious; i.e. one seeks
an optimal policy pi∗ such that, in addition, I(S;A)
as given by (4), with pi∗ substituted for pi, becomes
minimal. Such a policy p¯i∗ is called informationally
optimal.
An informationally optimal policy p¯i∗ can be inter-
preted in various ways:
1) among the optimal policies, it requires the least
amount of (Shannon) information to distinguish
the states S the agent is in;
2) this can be interpreted as the strongest restriction
(in terms of information) of the MDP to a
process where the state can only be partially ob-
served (a partially observable MDP) but where
still an optimal value can be reached without the
use of memory (see also [27]);
3) alternatively, this can be interpreted as the min-
imal cost on sensory processing power of a
memoryless agent achieving an optimal policy.
To compute informationally optimal policies, one first
determines the optimal value function V ∗(s) in one of
the well-established ways (e.g. by alternating value it-
eration and then selecting greedy policies, Sec. III-A3)
[31]. With the optimal value function V ∗(s) one then
uses the Lagrangian formalism to formulate the uncon-
strained minimization problem
min
pi
(
I(S;A)− β ·E[Q∗(S,A)]
)
(5)
for infinite (in practice very large) β where the expec-
tation E is taken over the joint distribution of states
S and actions A given by p(s, a) = pi(a|s)p(s). This
turns out to be virtually identical with the so-called
rate-distortion problem from information theory [23],
[32], for which the Blahut-Arimoto fixed point iteration
is well established. It consists of a double iteration
alternating updates for the policy pi and the resulting
action distribution p(a) =
∑
s pi(a|s)p(s) to compute
an informationally optimal policy p¯i∗:
pi(k)(a|s) = Z−1 · p(k−1)(a) · exp (β Q∗(s, a)) (6)
p(k)(a) =
∑
s∈S
pi(k−1)(a|s) · p(s) (7)
where pi(k) and p(k)(a) are the estimates for policy
and action distribution in the k-th iteration step and
Z is a normalization factor. Under mild conditions,
this iteration converges to a solution for (5). As in
[25], we call the resulting mutual information I(S;A)
for a value-wise and informationally optimal policy p¯i∗
relevant information for the given MDP.
D. Informationally Suboptimal Policies
We are now introduce the general methodology for
suboptimal policies, policies that achieve a particular,
but no longer optimal, value E[V pi(S)]. In Sec. IV-C,
where we considered optimal policies only, we com-
puted first the optimal value function V ∗(s) and from
it, via (3), Q∗(s, a). This optimal value which does
not depend on the policy and is universal for an MDP
scenario was used in the iterations (6),(7). This is no
longer true, however, when we seek policies pi that are
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informationally optimal at a suboptimal value level,
since in these cases, the value function V pi(s) and its
associated utility Qpi(s, a) will in general depend on
the policy.
While we still can write the Lagrangian minimization
task as
min
pi
(
I(S;A)− β ·E[Qpi(S,A)]
)
, (8)
now not only I(S;A), but also Qpi(s, a) depends on the
policy pi. Thus a solution for (8) must be self-consistent
not only with respect to (6),(7), but also with respect to
the Bellman equation (2). This double self-consistency
criterium can be used to derive an algorithm for finding
solutions for (8): a single step of value iteration (2) is
followed by a single step of the Blahut-Arimoto update
(6),(7), repeating until convergence. This method was
proposed in [25], and the universal convergence of an
extension of this algorithm been conjectured [27], but
not proven.
The computations in the following will all use this
algorithm5. For β → ∞, the algorithm computes an
optimal strategy that is also informationally optimal,
consistent with (5) which uses the optimal Q∗ di-
rectly. For smaller β, the algorithm produces policies
pi that are informationally optimal for a given value
E[V pi(S)]. The trade-off curves in Fig. 3 can be read
in two ways: either as the least information I(S;A)
to reach a particular value E[V pi(S)] or the best value
E[V pi(S)] that can be reached for a fixed information
I(S;A). In particular, in the latter, E[V pi(S)] will
increase monotonically with growing I(S;A).
V. EXPERIMENTS
We consider two main scenarios. In both scenarios, we
use a square grid world with a varying goal for each
of the scenarios. An agent is located in a cell of the
grid world, and can take one of four actions, moving
it north, east, south or west from the cell the
agent is currently in.
To implicitly specify the goal position in the scenarios,
we define the reward structure Rs′s,a as follows: for
each step taken outside the goal state, the reward is −1
(penalty). The grid world is finite and its boundaries are
delimited by “walls”; if an action moves the agent into
the walls, the agent does not move, but incurs the usual
reward −1. Once the goal is reached, the agent does
not move away from it and all further rewards are 0 —
5In the scenarios we are considering, we estimated or calculated
solutions for the extreme cases β → ∞ and β → 0 as “sanity
check” benchmarks. For intermediate values of β, we have grounds
to believe that the algorithm converged to the actual optimal solution;
the results are plausible and consistent with the confirmed limit
cases; further work is aiming to validate this assumption.
B
A
Fig. 2. Grid world with goal positions.
the task has finished. The value function V pi(s) gives
the negative of the expected duration of the travel from
a given state s to the given goal if the agent follows
policy pi.
A. Value-Information Trade-Offs for Goal Variations
We now specify the scenarios in detail. Consider a 11×
11 square (Fig. 2). Here, we consider two cases: a goal
at the top right corner of the grid (A) and a goal in the
center of the grid (B). Assuming that the start position
is equidistributed over the grid, case B has the shorter
average shortest path lengths to the goal and thus the
higher optimal values V ∗(s) since this value is the
negative of the path length.
Figure 3 shows the trade-off between the value
achieved for given information I(S;A) for cases A
and B under the self-consistent condition (8) for β ∈
(0,∞). The top right corner in each graph corresponds
to β →∞, the optimal value E[V ∗(S)] (shortest path
to the goal) and the minimum information required
to achieve it. As one reduces β, I(S;A) drops and
the policy uses less information about the state S,
thus leading to a drop of E[V pi(S)]. The limit case
is where trade-off curve meets the y-axis and the
information I(S;A) becomes 0, the curve intersecting
with the vertical axis at the best value that can be
achieved by an completely blind agent. In case A
(solid curve in Fig. 3), the optimal policy requires a
relevant information of ≈ 0.166 bit, achieving a value
of ≈ −10.1. The other extreme case of a blind agent
with I(S;A)→ 0, achieved by a policy which selects a
north or east move with probability 0.5 each, still
reaches a value of ≈ −14.5, and is thus reasonably
effective in reaching the goal.
In case B, the optimal strategy achieves a better value
of −5.5, since the target state is in the center of
the square. However, compared A, this comes at the
price of a considerably higher amount of relevant
information, namely of I(S;A) ≈ 1.17 bit per step
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Fig. 3. Trade-off between average value and minimal required
information I(S;A) for the square grid MDP from Fig. 2. The
horizontal axis shows the information I(S;A) per decision and
the vertical axis shows the corresponding value achieved with this
information. For higher values, more information is required. The
trade-off for A, solid curve, achieves a slightly lower optimal value,
but, for most of its parts is strongly favoured to the B trade-off
curve.
taken. This effect becomes even more pronounced
when one moves on the trade-off curve towards the
limit of blind agents I(S;A) → 0. The value in this
case goes towards ≈ −205 (outside of the Figure) and
the corresponding strategy becomes a purely random
walk. The trade-off curve (dashed curve in Fig. 3)
for B lies mostly to the right and below that for A.
This indicates that case B is, for most of the part
far less favourable than case A in terms of “value for
information”. We will return to these observations.
B. Value-Information Trade-Offs for Relabeled Actions
In the scenarios of Sec. V-A, we varied the goal state
between the corner of the world and the centre. In the
scenario of the present section, however, we are going
to investigate another effect.
1) Action Relabeling: Qualitative Description: In the
scenario from Sec. V the agent performed actions
north, east, south or west which we implied
to have the usual effect in the grid world. However,
there is nothing in the formalism of MDPs that re-
quires “north”, “east”, “south” or “west” to
“mean” the same operation in each state: these are
merely labels of four actions that are available to the
agent in each state of the world. Intuitively, when we
consider an agent “embodied” even in a grid world,
we mean action north to effect roughly the same
operation in each state (with exception of the wall
and the goal). However, the MDP formalism allows
us to take a “platonic” stance and to assume that the
four action directions are just arbitrary labels attached
to the actions available to the agent in the current
state, with no discernible consistency over different
states. More precisely: consider two scenarios, one is
the original case A, with the goal in the corner, and
the actions labeling the directions of movement in the
traditional way. In the second, however, keep the world
unchanged, but rename the labels for the four actions
in each grid state randomly north, east, south
and west. This random relabeling is done before the
learning run is carried out, the world remains fully
deterministic for the agent; the only change is that there
is no consistency in the action labels throughout the
grid. In other words, the agent does no longer “carry
its actions with it”.
2) Action Relabeling: Formal Description: We now
describe formally the relabeling. This third case,
case A˜, consists of a relabeling of the actions of case A
in the following sense: given an MDP (Ps′s,a,Rs
′
s,a), a
relabeling of this MDP is given by (P˜s′s,a, R˜s
′
s,a) such
that P˜s′s,a := Ps
′
s,σs(a)
and analogous for R˜s′s,a, where
σs is a permutation A → A of the actions which is, in
general, different for each s ∈ S. In the special case of
σs being the identity permutation for all states s ∈ S,
we reobtain the original MDP.
Importantly, from the point of pure MDP optimization,
any relabeling of actions is completely irrelevant. Op-
timal policies can be computed with the usual value
iteration (2), and the resulting values are independent
of the relabeling, i.e. one has V ∗(s) = V˜ ∗(s) for all
s ∈ S if V˜ ∗ is the optimal value function for the
relabeled MDP. More generally, if we operate with a
general policy pi and consider the Q-function, the Q-
values of the original MDP can be related to the new
one via the transformation Q˜pi(s, a) = Qp˜i(s, σs(a))
where pi(s, a) = p˜i(s, σs(a)), that is p˜i(s, a′) =
pi(s, σ−1s (a
′)). In other words, with the exception of
an appropriate relabeling of the actions in each state
s for a given policy, the relabeled MDP is precisely
equivalent to the original one. This is a “platonic”
view of the traditional MDP picture: no matter how the
“embodiment” (in form of action labels) is modified,
it has no consequences for solving the task.
3) Informational Consequences of Action Relabeling:
However, once we include the information processing
cost into the consideration, this changes drastically.
Figure 4 shows again the earlier trade-off curve (solid
line) between value and information for case A where
actions north, east, south, west correspond to
the usual directions; furthermore, it shows the trade-
off curve for case A˜, where the actions have been
relabeled for each state with a different random but
fixed permutation (dashed line).
The optimal value for case A had been ≈ −10.1
(Sec. V-A), and this is also the optimal value achieved
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Fig. 4. Value/Relevant Information trade-offs for the square grid
MDP. The horizontal axis shows the relevant information per deci-
sion and the vertical axis shows the corresponding value achieved
with this relevant information. Note that the optimal value achieved
is the same for case A (solid line) and case A˜ (dashed line), but at a
much higher information cost for case A˜ and generally that curves
lies below and right, thus unfavourably to the trade-off curve for
case A.
in the relabeled scenario of case A˜, consistently with
the discussion in Sec. V-B2.
Now, the differences: while the optimal value
E[V ∗(S)] achieved (top-right positions of both curves)
is exactly the same for both scenarios, the trade-off
curve for the randomly relabeled MDP (A˜) lies far
below and to the right to that for A. In particular,
for the optimal policy, A˜ requires more than 1.1 bit
of information per step. In other words, for the same
performance, much more information intake is required
in case A˜. And note that, without seeing the action
relabeling, an external observer just watching the agent
from outside would not reveal any strategy different
from that of A. When one now moves towards van-
ishing I(S;A), i.e. the blind agent, the value drops
rapidly6 to below −222, performing at around the level
of for the blind agent of case B.
VI. DISCUSSION
The results show that minor changes in an MDP can in-
duce drastically different outcomes in the informational
“metabolism” of the agent. In cases A and B it is clear
that the goal in the center is reachable by a slightly
shorter average shortest path length than the goal in
the corner. However, B requires significantly more
information to achieve the optimal solution than A.
The effect becomes more pronounced when we reduce
information bandwidth; in this case, the achievable
value for B drops off very rapidly as compared to A.
6The value/information trade-off curve at vanishing I(S;A) is
almost vertical; the smallest β value in our experiments β = 10−4,
reaching I(S;A) = 2.4 · 10−5bit.
For A, the wall boundary of the grid helps the agent
find the goal in the corner. Even blindly, the agent can
randomly select north and east actions, and the
walls will guide it as a funnel towards the goal. For
the goal in the center, however, the environment can
no longer support the agent in finding the goal: here,
a blind agent cannot hope to do better than a random
walk.
The role of embodiment in relieving the agent’s cog-
nitive burden becomes even more striking in case A˜.
All that is dropped from A to A˜ is the consistency
of actions (“directions”) over the states. From an
MDP point of view these are exactly equivalent cases.
However, once the cognitive burden is included into
the consideration, A˜ is informationally disadvantaged
to A. Not only does the optimal case β →∞ require
significantly more information per step for A˜, but also,
once one moves towards a blind agent, it performs
no better than B. Although still in the corner, unlike
in A, in A˜ the goal cannot be longer found by the
increasingly blinded agent using the wall as “funnel”.
Instead, the agent needs significantly more information
about the current state to identify which two actions in
the given state would correspond to the north/east
actions of the original case A. This requires a much
larger information intake in A˜, finally leading to the
completely uninformed random walk for the fully
blinded agent. All that distinguishes case A and A˜ is
how the selected action is carried out in the agent’s
environment.
Concludingly, this provides a prime illustration of the
principle of environmental, and more specifically of
embodied computation in how embodiment, even in
the abstracted view adopted in the present paper, can
affect the performance of an agent, once the cognitive
burden is taken into consideration,
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